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On January 1st, 2007, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) detectives 
received another devastating call.  Janecia Peters, a twenty-five-year-old mother, 
had been found shot to death and dumped in a trash bin.1  She was the serial killer’s 
tenth victim.2  Dubbed the “Grim Sleeper” for his alleged thirteen-year hiatus from 
killing, police knew the perpetrator murdered at least ten young women over a 
twenty-two year period from 1985 to 2007.3  The murderer followed a distinct 
modus operandi of shooting women at point-blank range in his car. Most of the 
bodies had been discovered in abandoned alleyways or dumpsters, and DNA 
swabbed off each victim’s body matched a single perpetrator.4 
A 2008 profile search of this DNA evidence produced negative results.5  The 
killer’s DNA was not in the FBI-maintained Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS), crushing hopes of an investigatory lead.  Eighteen months later, police 
conducted another profile search, this time using a new technique called Y-
chromosomal short tandem repeat (Y-STR) testing.  The test, which “analyzes the 
variation on the male (Y) chromosome in nuclear DNA,” produced a hit.6  A 
convicted felon shared the killer’s Y-STR profile, meaning he was a patrilineal male 
relative (i.e. father, son, uncle, cousin) of the Grim Sleeper. 
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Police quickly identified the convict’s father, Lonnie Franklin Jr., as a possible 
suspect.  While Franklin had never been arrested, his son’s DNA was in CODIS due 
to a 2009 felony weapons charge.7  After conducting an undercover operation to 
obtain Franklin’s DNA, police confirmed his involvement in the murders.  
Franklin’s DNA matched the DNA found on each victim.  He was arrested in 2010, 
and sentenced to death on August 10th, 2016.8  Today, investigators suspect Franklin 
may be responsible for the deaths of at least 25 women.9  Without the advent of Y-
STR testing, it is possible Franklin would still be at large. 
This case is a testament to the potential of familial DNA searches using Y-STR 
technology.10  However, the use of Y-STR DNA searching is contested.  First 
conceived in 1992, Y-STR profiling did not reach the U.S. criminal justice system 
until the U.S. Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) 
released testing kits in 2003.11  Described as an “especially hard-won method,” Y-
STR DNA testing is useful in narrowing investigations by identifying either the 
suspect himself or the suspect’s biological male relatives.12  Notably, the DNA 
Identification Act of 1994 is silent regarding the legality of familial searching.13  
Perhaps hesitant to employ familial searching without express congressional 
approval, the FBI states that “routine familial searching at the national level is not 
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recommended at this time.”14  As a result, the legal rules governing familial 
searching in the U.S. are driven by a “patchwork of state law, state and local 
regulation, and even internal laboratory policies.”15  Legal scholars Nessa Lynch and 
Liz Campbell argue these variations in U.S. law make it nearly “impossible to 
formulate a precise legal picture.”16  While some states (such as California and 
Colorado) endorse familial searching, others (including Maryland and the District 
of Columbia) ban the practice.17  Caught in the middle of the debate, the majority of 
states lack clear rules either authorizing or forbidding familial searches.18 
This note will argue in favor of the admissibility of Y-STR DNA evidence.  
Like any new technology, Y-STR DNA testing will face rigorous challenges before 
it can achieve widespread acceptance in the forensic science community.  However, 
state courts have consistently held that Y-STR testing is reliable, relevant, and not 
unfairly prejudicial.  Moreover, the expansion of DNA databases and New York’s 
recent acceptance of familial DNA searching suggests the investigatory method is 
gaining traction in the U.S. criminal justice system.  If implemented with clear 
procedural safeguards, the benefits of Y-STR DNA testing will outweigh its costs.  
This note proposes legislation for the admissibility of familial Y-STR DNA 
searching.  A formal law-making approach would mitigate constitutional concerns, 
while simultaneously taking advantage of Y-STR DNA’s evidentiary potential.  
Part I discusses the arguments in favor and against Y-STR DNA testing, 
including its potential impact on exonerations and miscarriages of justice.  In Part 
II, this note analyzes potential barriers to admissibility, including: Federal Rule of 
Evidence (Rule) 702 (i.e., the Daubert/Frye standard), Rule 403’s bar to unfairly 
prejudicial evidence, and the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable 
searches.  Part III considers current state and federal policies regarding familial 
searching and Y-STR DNA.  In addition, Part III details a proposed blueprint for 
future state legislation regarding the admissibility of familial searching and Y-STR 
DNA evidence.  
 
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST Y-STR 
 
Y-STR DNA testing poses great benefits and challenges.  Not only can the 
technology aid criminal investigations and solve cold cases, it also has the potential 
to exonerate the wrongfully condemned.  On the other hand, positive identifications 
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are not guaranteed, genetic testing raises privacy concerns, existing legal barriers 
could stymie widespread acceptance, and errors can result in the miscarriage of 
justice.   
 
A. The Case for Y-STR  
 
Proponents of Y-STR testing point to success stories such as the location of the 
Grim Sleeper, the identification of Santa Cruz rapist Elvis Lorenzo Garcia, and the 
recent apprehension of suspected child-molester Justin Christian in Cleveland.19  
These cases, while noteworthy, are not anomalies.  In March 2017, defendant Jeffery 
Netherton pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated rape in Tennessee after 
prosecutors established his guilt using Y-STR DNA.20  According to District 
Attorney General Bryant Dunaway, “[l]ast year, Jeffery Netherton was tried before 
a jury for these charges.  The jury didn’t reach a verdict at the time, in part, because 
prosecutors didn’t have the benefit of what is called Y-STR DNA testing.”21  
Familial searching solved another cold case in December 2017, when Texas police 
used a discarded cigarette to link Byron Lloyd Collins to the sexual assault and 
murder of a fifty-year-old woman.22 
Furthermore, the Grim Sleeper is not the only infamous serial killer to be 
identified using Y-STR DNA.  The Boston Police Department used Y-STR DNA 
testing to confirm the identity of the so-called “Boston Strangler” in 2013.23  Never 
convicted of the Boston Strangler killings, Albert DeSalvo was stabbed to death in 
prison in 1973 by fellow inmates while serving a life sentence for unrelated rape 
charges.24  Nearly fifty years later, Boston authorities found a match between Y-
STR DNA recovered on one of the Boston Strangler’s victims and DeSalvo’s 
nephew.25  Police exhumed DeSalvo’s body and used standard (non-Y 
chromosomal) STR DNA analysis to verify the killer’s identity—at an accuracy 
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level of one in 220 billion.26  Authorities believe DeSalvo raped and murdered at 
least eleven women during his lifetime.27 
Used effectively, Y-STR familial searching can solve cold cases.28  With 
estimates of 256,000 unsolved U.S. homicide cases since 1980, law enforcement is 
fighting an uphill battle to hunt down violent criminals.29  Sadly, police efforts are 
falling short.  America’s clearance rate (i.e., the number of homicides solved) has 
dropped from approximately 90% in 1964 to approximately 64% in 2012.30  The 
Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) reports that out of every 1,000 
rapes, 995 perpetrators will walk free.31  In the words of forensic scientist and Y-
STR advocate Dr. Jack Ballantyne, the Associate Director for Forensic Research at 
the National Center for Forensic Science, “[w]e have to make a good faith 
effort . . . to make sure every victim, who is victim of a sexual assault, gets some 
closure.”32  If Y-STR DNA could solve even a fraction of these forgotten cases, 
more victims would receive answers and fewer perpetrators would remain at large. 
Just as Y-STR DNA testing has the potential to increase arrest and conviction 
rates, it also has the power to exonerate innocent men.  The exclusionary aspect of 
DNA statistical analysis allows forensic scientists to exclude non-matching Y-
chromosome profiles from suspicion.  Like standard STR analysis, Y-STR 
interpretation is based on exclusion rates.  When comparing Y-STR DNA to a crime 
scene sample or database profile, there are three possible results: (1) exclusion 
“because the Y-STR profiles are different and could not have originated from the 
same source,” (2) inconclusive where the statistical results are too ambiguous to 
draw a conclusion, or (3) failure to exclude because the profiles likely originated 
from the same source or a patrilineal male relative.33  Exclusion is the most 
conclusive finding. If the allele profiles do not match, the Y-STR DNA did not 
originate from the same source.  In contrast, “positive” results (i.e., failure to 
exclude) are more problematic.  While matching profiles may indicate the Y-STR 
DNA originated from the same source, the genetic similarities between the samples 
could be attributed to mutation, paternal relatives, or even a random match.34 
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Several foreign jurisdictions have taken advantage of Y-STR DNA’s 
exclusionary characteristics by relying on profiles to eliminate suspects and 
exonerate wrongfully convicted men.  In one of the first cases to employ Y-STR 
DNA technology, Germany exonerated a convicted rapist in the early 1990s using 
alleles from the Y-chromosome.35  Polish authorities used Y-STR DNA collected 
from semen stains to eliminate 421 suspects in the rape of 14 women and the murder 
of another.36  Japanese police utilized Y-STR DNA in 2008 to exonerate a man 
convicted of murdering a four-year-old girl.37  The suspect was released after 
spending nineteen years in prison for a crime he did not commit.38 
Given the relatively modest usage of Y-STR testing in the U.S. criminal justice 
system,39 its true effect on wrongful convictions is unknown.  However, recent 
exonerations suggest post-conviction Y-STR DNA testing is becoming more 
prevalent in the U.S.  One study of 194 DNA-related exonerations concluded that 
Y-STR DNA was responsible for overturning 16% of the analyzed wrongful 
convictions.40  Compared to other types of DNA analysis, Y-STR testing was the 
second most successful at uncovering errors (standard STR analysis won, 
accounting for 70% of analyzed exonerations).41  For example, in May 2010, the 
Ohio Innocence Project relied on Y-STR testing to free Raymond Towler.42  After 
receiving a life sentence for allegedly raping an eleven-year-old girl and assaulting 
her twelve-year-old male cousin, Towler sought a DNA test to prove his 
innocence.43  Y-STR DNA evidence collected from the female victim’s underwear 
excluded Towler as the perpetrator.44  At the age of fifty-two, Towler walked out of 
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prison and received $2.5 million in compensation from the state of Ohio.45  He spent 
twenty-eight years in prison.46  
Similarly, Virginia employed Y-STR DNA testing to exonerate Sherman 
Brown in 2016.47  Brown was originally sentenced to death after being convicted of 
murdering a four-year-old boy and raping his mother in 1969.48  Eventually, the 
court resentenced Brown to life in prison.49  Nearly 40 years later, the Innocence 
Project reviewed Brown’s case and pushed for DNA testing.50  The unidentified Y-
STR DNA found on the female victim’s vaginal swab excluded Brown, paving the 
way for his exoneration.51  In Brown’s words, “I was still numb to the fact that I was 
really going to be killed . . . I’ve been confined since then.”52  Now at the age of 
sixty-nine, Brown expresses gratitude that he was not executed for a crime he never 
committed.53  
Kenneth Ireland, another wrongfully-convicted prisoner, expressed similar 
gratitude for the DNA evidence that secured his own exoneration.54 According to 
Ireland, “[w]hen the crime happened, DNA was the stuff of science fiction . . . It was 
this fairy-tale stuff that people talked about.”55  Ireland got his miracle in 2009, when 
Connecticut’s Division of Public Defender Services excluded him from the DNA 
collected in the rape and murder of a thirty-year-old woman.56  When asked if he 
would consent to the DNA testing, Ireland replied, “[a]bsolutely, I’ve got nothing 
else to lose.”57 
Success stories aside, not everyone takes Ireland’s optimistic view of 
exoneration-focused Y-STR testing.  Concerns about scientific efficacy, unfair 
prejudice, and compromised privacy remain.  Scientific limitations of Y-STR 
analysis and biased defense attorneys (i.e., “unfairly prejudiced” in favor of 
exoneration) could affect the accuracy of overturned convictions.  Finally, 
exoneration-focused Y-STR testing has the potential to implicate new defendants by 
dragging additional families (and private family information) into police 
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investigations.  Yet Y-STR DNA’s potential to free innocent men is promising.  The 
Innocence Project reports the average exoneree spends fourteen years in prison.58  If 
approached cautiously, an expansion of Y-STR DNA testing could prevent (or at 
least reduce) the staggering consequences of wrongful conviction.  
 
B. The Case Against Y-STR  
 
Despite its promise, opponents contend familial searching (and Y-STR DNA 
testing in particular) is laden with low success rates, privacy concerns, and possible 
constitutional barriers.  Outspoken critic and New York University law professor 
Erin Murphy suggests that anecdotal evidence from familial searching in the U.S. 
reflects a 10% success rate (i.e., arrest or conviction).59  Other estimates, while 
higher, are not awe-inspiring.  As of January 2015, the National Institute of Justice 
reported that twenty-three of ninety familial searches in Denver identified a true 
biological relative of the offender—a success rate of approximately 25.6%.60  A 
similar analysis revealed a success rate of 39% in California and 21% in the United 
Kingdom.61  The FBI notes that “CODIS matches, in general, have very low 
efficiency in locating true relatives in offender databases” due to the increasing 
likelihood that unrelated individuals will share the same alleles at multiple loci in 
large DNA databases.62  In other words, as the size of the database increases, more 
unrelated (or very distantly related) individuals will share the same or similar DNA 
profile. Such mistaken genetic correlations can promote “dead-end leads” and result 
in poor resource management.63  
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Efficacy rates aside, other detractors voice trepidations over privacy.  Patient 
education writer Jessica Cerretani points out that familial searching, like Y-STR 
DNA analysis, can place “criminals’ relatives under genetic surveillance—possibly 
tracked for life and subjected to police harassment—simply because their close 
family member, whose DNA is on record, may have committed a crime.”64  George 
Washington University law professor Jeffrey Rosen echoes Cerretani’s concerns, 
equating familial searching with the English common law doctrine of “corruption of 
the blood.”65  Under the doctrine, which was largely rejected in Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution, the descendants of a felon could not inherit his title or estate.66  
Rosen argues familial searching similarly “punishes” family members for the crimes 
of their blood relatives by exposing them to unwarranted genetic profiling.67  If not 
deprived of property per se, family members of individuals with DNA in CODIS 
may be contacted by the police, asked to provide a DNA sample, or pressured into 
confessing to a crime they did not commit.68  
Moreover, familial searching could conceivably expose private or otherwise 
unknown family information, such as “paternity, incest, immigration eligibility, 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status, or fertility.”69  Government misuse of 
this sensitive data has the potential to facilitate coercion, embarrass involved parties, 
and ultimately tear families apart.  As director of the Massachusetts State Police 
Crime Lab, Guy Vallaro, comments, “California has done a very thorough job of 
ensuring that [it has] all the quality measures in place for familial searching.  But 
that takes a lot of time and money.”70  In reality, some states likely lack the necessary 
determination and economic resources to implement effective and corruption-free 
Y-STR DNA analysis.  Without careful observance of legislative mandates and 
criminal procedure, the technology has the potential to do more harm than good.  
Finally, several legal scholars contend that familial searching raises Fourth 
Amendment concerns.  While no U.S. court has yet ruled on the constitutionality of 
familial searching, a successful challenge is plausible.  The Fourth Amendment, 
which protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, could be 
invoked on two grounds: (1) whether the use of Y-STR DNA constitutes a search, 
and (2) whether that search is reasonable.71  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the collection of physical biological material for forensic purposes is a search under 
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the Fourth Amendment.72  However, whether subsequent testing and analysis of that 
sample constitutes a search is less clear.73  Even if considered a search, the 
reasonableness of using collected Y-STR DNA is up for debate. In balancing an 
individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches against the government’s 
interest in preserving public safety, Y-STR DNA critics argue familial searching 
casts arbitrary suspicion on potentially innocent family members.74  Due to racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system, “familial searches will more profoundly 
impact communities of color.”75  Black individuals are incarcerated at a rate of 5.1 
times that of white individuals, meaning that Y-STR DNA testing is more likely to 
implicate black families than white ones.76 
These concerns over scientific efficacy, prejudice, and privacy will be 
addressed below.  While Y-STR testing places a unique twist on standard STR 
testing, it is not a fundamentally new or unprecedented science.  As Dr. Ballantyne 
states, “[t]he technology that is used for Y-STRs is the same basic technology we 
have for autosomals [analysis on a non-sex chromosome, i.e., standard STR 
analysis].  Labs have that technology.  It is a standard, relatively straightforward way 
of doing genotyping, or in this case we call it haplotyping.”77  Given its foundation 
in standard STR analysis, Y-STR testing can (and should) be considered in relation 
to existing defendant-friendly legal protections.  The Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
U.S. Constitution, and state legislation act as safeguards to ensure criminal 
defendants are not convicted on error-ridden, prejudicial, or unconstitutional DNA 
evidence.  
However, caution is warranted.  Like many technologies, Y-STR analysis has 
the capacity to facilitate miscarriages of justice.  Despite its bullet-proof depiction 
on American TV shows, forensic science is far from failsafe.  In fact, some forms of 
previously accepted forensic technology have been recently discredited.  For 
example, the FBI formally acknowledged systematic error in its microscopic hair 
analysis in 2015, condemning a practice that has driven the agency’s forensic 
investigations since 1989.78  Described as a “mass disaster” for the U.S. criminal 
justice system, the FBI’s flawed analysis stemmed from unwritten and scientifically 
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erroneous laboratory practices.79  Even worse, FBI experts frequently relied on 
“incomplete or misleading statistics” at trial.80  As a result, FBI examiners gave 
inaccurate testimony at 257 of the 268 reviewed trials (95%).81 
Y-STR DNA analysis poses similar risks.  Human error, coincidental matches, 
and even unexplained results can ruin lives.  Although DNA has “been hailed as a 
savior” to criminal investigation, it should not be touted as smoking-gun evidence.82  
University of California Irvine professor William Thompson became skeptical of 
DNA evidence as early as the 1980s.83  According to Thompson, “[t]he technology 
had been accepted by the public as a silver bullet,” but he “happened to believe that 
it wasn’t.”84  Thompson’s intuition was right. After reviewing trial DNA evidence 
from a 1999 Houston rape case, he concluded that Houston lab technicians “were 
routinely misinterpreting even the most basic samples.”85  A re-test of male DNA 
evidence exonerated twenty-year-old Josiah Sutton, who served four years in prison 
due to gross incompetence in the Houston crime lab.86  Upon his release, Sutton 
reflected that “[g]oing to prison, for [him], was like seeing [his] death before it 
happens.”87 
Other innocent defendants have fallen victim to coincidental matches—another 
harrowing reminder of DNA’s limitations.  For example, Chen Long-Qi lived as a 
convicted rapist for five years before Taiwanese authorities uncovered an error in 
the Y-STR DNA testing used to prove his alleged guilt.88  Even though Chen’s Y-
STR profile “matched” the perpetrator’s profile at seventeen alleles, he was 
innocent.89  Chen’s damning Y-STR profile was the result of a statistical anomaly—
a coincidental match across the number of tested alleles.90 
Because each human possesses his or her own unique genetic code, coincidental 
DNA matches are unusual.  Forensic mathematician Charles Brenner estimates that 
the probability of two randomly-selected males exhibiting a Y-chromosome match 
is approximately one in 8,800 among Caucasians.91 A coincidental match 
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probability may be higher for certain ethnicities.  For example, Brenner estimates 
one in 3,300 randomly-selected Chinese men will have identical Y-STR profiles 
across the analyzed number of alleles.92 Accordingly, the odds of a coincidental Y-
STR match are low, but feasible.  Y-STR DNA evidence, like all DNA evidence, is 
merely a “statistical probability of coincidence.”93 
Furthermore, laboratory errors can exacerbate the chances of a coincidental 
match.  In Chen’s case, the collected crime sample contained Y-chromosomal DNA 
from multiple men.94  When lab analysts examine DNA from multiple people they 
must attempt to separate out allele markers from each individual source.95  
Unfortunately, the process is both difficult and risky.  With multiple people’s DNA 
in the pool, a few allele markers from each person may be accidentally combined to 
produce a coincidental match.96  After reviewing Chen’s case, Boise State 
University professor Greg Hampikian concluded the existence of an intermixed 
sample raised the probability of a coincidental Y-STR match in Chen’s case to one 
in 741.97  In a city of twenty-three million people, thousands of men (other than 
Chen) could have a produced a match.98  If forensic examiners had refrained from 
testing the mixed Y-STR DNA, it is possible Chen’s false conviction would have 
been avoided.99  
It is worth noting that an unknown number of DNA errors go unnoticed—or 
are blatantly concealed.  Murphy contends that reported cases of DNA “mix-ups, 
transfer, or contamination” are limited to circumstances where suspects can prove 
their innocence.100  Unless defense attorneys are willing to review old cases, hunt 
for forensic errors, and (ideally) catch the correct criminal, most wrongfully-
convicted men have no recourse. Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence to 
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suggest the “intentional planting of DNA” is not a mere fiction of crime thrillers.101  
Thompson argues that easy access to random DNA (i.e., cigarettes, drinking glasses, 
ball caps, etc.) combined with extensive DNA databases, raises the risk of false 
incriminations through framing. In Thompson’s own words, “[t]he ability of 
criminals to neutralize or evade crime control technologies has been a persistent 
theme.”102  As researchers develop new DNA methodologies to solve crime, 
perpetrators evolve to thwart them.  
Given the narrative and normative evidence discussed above, this note will now 
consider the legality of admitting Y-STR DNA evidence in court.  
 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF Y-STR 
 
As referenced supra, existing law could hinder widespread acceptance of Y-
STR DNA evidence.  Part III will analyze the admissibility of Y-STR DNA evidence 
under Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule) 702, Rule 403, and the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution.  
 
A. Is the Science Strong?  Y-STR DNA and Rule 702  
 
Under Rule 702, a trial judge may exclude expert scientific testimony if the 
evidence lacks reliability or relevance.103  This two-prong standard, adopted in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, utilizes a totality of the circumstances 
test to determine whether each prong is satisfied.104  Elements include: (1) whether 
the science can (or has been) tested, (2) whether the science has undergone peer 
review, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the science is 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.105  The “test of reliability is 
‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case.”106  Consequently, the court must balance the 
reliability of each piece of evidence on a case-by-case basis.  
Although Rule 702 superseded the “general acceptance” test under Frye v. 
United States, “general acceptance” is still a controlling factor in many cases.107  In 
Frye, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit held that a scientific 
principle must cross the line from “experimental” to “well-recognized” in its 
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particular field to gain general acceptance.108  A new discovery, however 
remarkable, will not be admitted until it has attained “standing and scientific 
recognition” across authorities in the relevant science, trade, or art.109  Since the 
Federal Rules of Evidence only apply in federal courts, state courts are free to adopt 
their own standards. Some jurisdictions, including California, New York, New 
Jersey, and the District of Columbia have refused to adopt the Daubert standard—
instead relying on Frye’s general acceptance test.110  Because state approaches vary, 
this note will refer to state evidentiary rules on reliability and relevance collectively 
as the “Daubert/Frye standard.” 
Not surprisingly, criminal defendants have challenged the admissibility of 
general Y-STR profiling under the Daubert/Frye standard (as opposed to familial 
Y-STR searching, which has yet to be challenged in court).  As a relatively new area 
of science, Y-STR profiling is potentially vulnerable to a lack of testing, peer review, 
and general acceptance.  Although the method is particularly advantageous in certain 
circumstances (i.e. traces of male DNA can be recovered from an overwhelmingly 
female DNA sample—rape, bite marks, skin underneath fingernails, etc.), Y-STR 
testing has significant limitations.111  Because the Y-chromosome is the smallest in 
the human genome, Y-STR testing lacks the discriminatory capacity of standard 
STR analysis.112  In normal STR testing, analysts examine short lengths of DNA in 
at least thirteen core locations (loci) along an individual’s twenty-two pairs of 
autosomal chromosomes.113  In contrast, DNA expert John Butler notes that only 
seven core loci on a single chromosome are routinely analyzed in Y-STR testing.114  
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With fewer statistics, an individual’s Y-STR profile is less complete than an STR 
profile.  
Furthermore, because the Y-chromosome is passed down from father to son 
unchanged, “all members of the same paternal lineage have the same Y-STR 
profile.”115  While this genetic consistency (barring mutation) lends itself to familial 
searching, the relatively low number of Y-STR profiles in the world weakens Y-
STR frequency statistics. In other words, instead of generating loci statistics of one 
in one billion (STR), Y-STR testing generally yields statistics closer to one in several 
thousand.116  Furthermore, because only males have Y-chromosomes, Y-STR testing 
is only useful in cases of male suspects.117  If a female is suspected, the method loses 
all efficacy.118 
Finally, Y-STR nomenclature is often confusing to judges, attorneys, jurors, 
and even forensic scientists.119  Due to the relatively quick emergence of Y-STR 
DNA testing across multiple disciplines (e.g., forensics, genealogy, and 
anthropology), laboratories assigned different names to the same allele markers.120  
It was not until 2006 that the International Society for Forensic Genetics (ISFG) 
DNA Commission undertook an investigation of Y-STR allele nomenclature.121  
The ISFG concluded that many of the widely-used Y-STR names were “not ideal,” 
but cautioned against additional renaming.122  In its official statement, the ISFG 
stated: “[t]o avoid further confusion due to nomenclature changes, the nomenclature 
of widely[-]used Y-STRs should not be altered, even if the present guidelines are 
not followed.”123  To resolve some of the existing frustration and ambiguity, the 
authors of the report recommended that Y-STR testing laboratories follow the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Standard Reference 
Manual’s guidelines and collaborate to ensure consistent usage.124 
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 Notwithstanding Rule 702 (i.e. Daubert/Frye) evidentiary concerns, state 
courts have consistently held that Y-STR DNA is both reliable and relevant to the 
fact finder.  In State v. Calleia, the government sought to admit Y-STR evidence 
which indicated the defendant (husband) could not be excluded as a donor of the 
skin cells recovered from under the victim’s (wife) fingernails.125  The defendant 
moved to exclude the evidence, arguing that Y-STR analysis had not “reached a 
level of development and acceptability within the relevant scientific community . . . 
to be deemed sufficiently reliable.”126  The Superior Court of New Jersey, applying 
the Frye standard, denied the defendant’s motion. Relying on expert testimony, 
authoritative scientific writings, and the prior admissibility of Y-STR DNA in other 
states and Canada, the court concluded Y-STR profiling is generally accepted in the 
forensic science community.127 
Citing language from State v. Calleia, Illinois also upheld the “general 
acceptance” of Y-STR evidence under Frye.  In People v. Zapata, police found Y-
STR DNA in a rape victim’s underwear.128  The Appellate Court of Illinois reviewed 
admissibility under a plain-error standard, which permits reversal where “clear or 
obvious error occurred, and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial.”129  When considering the first prong (i.e., whether the trial court 
made a clear error in admitting the Y-STR DNA evidence), the court held that no 
error occurred because Y-STR profiling has gained general acceptance.130  In People 
v. Stevey, the California Court of Appeals agreed, stating that general acceptance of 
Y-STR DNA has “never been challenged or questioned by members of the scientific 
community.”131 
Similarly, in People v. Tunis, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Y-STR 
evidence satisfies the Daubert reliability and relevance prongs.132  Y-STR testing 
was used to identify the assailant in a sexual assault, satisfying the relevance prong.  
Moreover, the evidence met the state’s “reliability” factors: (1) whether the scientific 
principle is reasonably reliable, and (2) whether the witness is qualified.133  The Y-
STR profile was reliable because it utilized generally accepted scientific methods, 
and relied on exclusion statistics used in other laboratories, fields, and 
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jurisdictions.134  Moreover, the witness was reliable because she had training and 
experience with Y-STR testing, and had previously testified as an expert witness.135 
Newer cases have reached the same conclusion.  In the 2017 case 
Commonwealth v. Jacoby, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the reliability 
of Y-STR DNA testing as a matter of first impression.136  According to the 
defendant, Y-STR databases are not sufficiently large enough to generate reliable 
results.137  Yet during a dialogue with the trial court, defense counsel admitted “the 
technique [Y-STR testing] is the same” as widely-established STR analysis.138  The 
court concluded that the defendant’s argument was “predicated upon the weight that 
should be assigned to the Y-STR DNA evidence, and not upon the novelty of the 
database process itself.”139  Because the probative value of evidence is to be 
determined by the jury, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the defendant’s pretrial motion for a Frye hearing regarding the 
admissibility of Y-STR DNA.140 
Courts in both Michigan and Wyoming have also upheld the scientific 
reliability and relevance of Y-STR DNA.  In Bean v. State, the parties stipulated 
before a Wyoming trial court that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary to determine 
the scientific reliability of Y-STR DNA.141  Both sides agreed that “DNA analysis, 
including the [Y-STR] method, is accepted science, which produces reliable results, 
assuming reliable data is used in the testing process.”142  The Court of Appeals of 
Michigan reached a similar conclusion in People v. Bieri, stating that the “defendant 
has not cited any evidence that indicates that this method of [Y-STR DNA] testing 
is not scientifically reliable.”143 
Given the consistent application of Rule 702 (Daubert/Frye standard) to 
general Y-STR testing across multiple state courts, it is unlikely states will exclude 
familial Y-STR searching on scientific grounds in the future.  However, it is worth 
noting that at least one federal court has found Y-STR DNA evidence inadmissible 
under Rule 702.  In United States v. Kooswatewa, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona barred Y-STR DNA evidence in a sexual assault case on the Hopi 
reservation.144  The defendant did not “contend that Y-STR DNA analysis or the 
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counting method are generally unreliable under Daubert.”145  Instead, the defendant 
argued the government’s relied-upon Y-STR database improperly pooled tribal 
DNA into a single “Native American category”—inflating match statistics.146  
Because the Y-STR match statistic had an extremely low discriminatory capacity of 
one in thirty-five, the court concluded the evidence lacked sufficient reliability under 
Rule 702.147 
Kooswatewa can be distinguished from the pro-admissibility state cases 
discussed above based on its facts.  An exclusion statistic of one in thirty-five is very 
poor for any type of forensic DNA evidence.  According to Applied Biosystems (the 
company which provided the Y-STR database in Kooswatewa), Y-STR testing 
typically produces match statistics of one in several thousand.148  Moreover, because 
the defendant’s profile was compared to the pooled DNA of Native American men 
from many different tribes, the exclusion statistic may be inaccurate.149  Defense 
expert and forensic mathematician Charles H. Brenner argues that “pooling Native 
Americans into a single genetic classification could manufacture diversity, thereby 
inflating random match probabilities to make the DNA profile appear rarer that [sic] 
it might actually be.”150  It is possible that one in twenty . . . or even one in ten men 
living on the Hopi Reservation would have matched the crime-scene Y-STR profile 
across the analyzed alleles.151  Given this dilemma of population substructure on the 
Hopi Reservation, the court found that the Y-STR DNA evidence was not premised 
on “sufficient facts or data” to meet Rule 702’s reliability standards.152 
Kooswatewa is a valid demonstration of Y-STR DNA’s limitations.  While 
generally accepted and reliable, Y-STR DNA analysis is not appropriate evidence 
in every case or forum.  Federal courts may be more prone to population substructure 
issues (i.e., Native American defendants living on genetically-homogeneous 
reservations) than state courts.  In addition, certain Y-STR samples may produce 
unusually non-discriminatory match statistics.  In these cases, courts are wise to 
exclude the Y-STR evidence under Rule 702.  The Federal Rules of Evidence give 
courts discretion for this very reason.  If the reliability or relevance of specific Y-
STR DNA evidence seems strained in a particular case, then the court can invoke 
the Daubert/Frye standard to prevent the jury from seeing it.  Furthermore, if a state 
is concerned about the scientific efficacy of Y-STR DNA, the legislature could draft 
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a statute which imposes additional relevance and reliability standards beyond 
Daubert/Frye.  For example, the statute could exclude Y-STR DNA match statistics 
which are less discriminatory than one in 300, one in 500, or even one in 700.  
A normative glance at Y-STR DNA’s scientific capabilities suggests the 
method is reliable, and getting better.  As acknowledged by numerous forensic 
experts and courts, the science behind Y-STR DNA testing is simply an expansion 
of existing STR analysis to the Y-chromosome.  Neither the Y-STR testing process, 
nor the interpretation of match statistics is novel.  Rather, Y-STR DNA analysis is 
an innovative way of applying old technology to newly-identified alleles.  If 
interpreted accurately and admitted in consideration of Rule 702’s constraints, Y-
STR DNA has the potential to reliably advance investigations and reverse errors.  
 
B. Unfairly Prejudicial?  Y-STR DNA and Rule 403  
 
The general Y-STR testing process has also withstood Rule 403 challenges.  
Rule 403 excludes evidence when the risk of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs its probative value.153  In People v. Robinson, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress Y-STR DNA under California Evidence Code 
section 352 (i.e., California’s version of Rule 403).154  While the defendant argued 
the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because its complexity would mislead the jury, 
the court disagreed.155  The Y-STR DNA (recovered from a baseball cap found at 
the crime scene) was only a small piece of the government’s argument—and 
therefore unlikely to sway the jury.156  Furthermore, because counsel accurately 
presented the significance of the Y-STR DNA (i.e., that it can only exclude possible 
donors), the court concluded the evidence’s probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.157 
The Supreme Court of Michigan reached the same conclusion in People v. 
Wood.158  When the government sought to admit Y-STR evidence from the victim’s 
scarf and fingernail clippings, the defendant raised both Rule 702 and Rule 403 
challenges.159  After establishing the evidence met the Daubert standard, the court 
dismissed the defendant’s Rule 403 argument.160  Because both experts clearly 
explained the limitations of the Y-STR evidence (i.e., that the test cannot uniquely 
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identify a male DNA donor), any danger of confusion or unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh the probative value of the Y-STR profile.161   
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Lally, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the government’s reliance on “counting 
method” Y-STR statistics was deceptive.162  According to the defendant, the 
counting method (providing exclusionary statistics such as one in one thousand) 
“would be misleading without the confidence interval correction.”163  Unlike 
exclusionary statistics, confidence intervals adjust Y-STR match results to 
artificially account for sampling errors and coincidental matches.164  The court 
acknowledged that confidence intervals are more favorable to the defendant, but 
held that “count” evidence is unlikely to mislead the jury into concluding Y-STR 
evidence can exclude all other possible contributors.165  Because experts provided 
the necessary context for Y-STR DNA, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.166 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the non-prejudicial nature of 
Y-STR DNA under less concrete facts in State v. Maestas.167  The defendant 
challenged Y-STR evidence on Rule 403 grounds, contending the “jury was unduly 
impressed” after the prosecution stated his Y-STR DNA “matched” the crime scene 
sample.168  The court disagreed, concluding the jury was fully capable of lending the 
Y-STR evidence proper weight.169  Although the prosecution referred to the 
defendant’s DNA “matching” the sample numerous times, an expert clarified that a 
“match” only meant that the defendant could not be excluded as a possible 
contributor.170  Because the jurors heard this testimony, the court reasoned the 
evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and that the jury could arrive at a clear 
understanding of Y-STR evidence.171 
Finally, in People v. Pike, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that any “CSI 
Effect,” or popular romanticization of DNA evidence, did not cause the jury to 
improperly weigh Y-STR evidence.172  The defendant moved to suppress Y-STR 
DNA collected from a handgun, arguing the influence of pop culture unfairly 
prejudiced the jury in favor of DNA statistics.173  The court rejected the defendant’s 
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Rule 403 argument, calling the assumption “completely unfounded,” “patronizing,” 
and “dangerous” because it reflected a lack of trust in juries.174  Moreover, the court 
noted that “statistical probability calculations have been part of our judicial system 
for quite some time now.”175  According to the court, there was no need to 
“resurrect” a Rule 403 argument that failed years ago when standard STR evidence 
was originally admitted.176 
If presented accurately, Y-STR DNA evidence is not inherently prejudicial.  
Just like standard STR analysis, Y-STR evidence is premised on exclusionary match 
statistics.  Also, just like STR evidence, Y-STR DNA requires a thorough 
explanation before the jury.  As the Appellate Court of Illinois noted in People v. 
Pike, statistics have been a part of jury trials for decades (and perhaps even 
centuries).177  True, forensic match probabilities are complex and not always 
intuitive.  However, the same could be said for hair fiber, gunshot residue, 
fingerprint, handwriting, and shoe impression analysis.  No single forensic discipline 
is free of ambiguity or potential manipulation.  Consequently, courts use Rule 403 
as a barrier to misleading evidence in specific cases where Y-STR DNA is used or 
described improperly. 
Furthermore, existing case law indicates the general Y-STR testing process is 
not unfairly prejudicial—suggesting any evidence collected through familial Y-STR 
searches will also pass the Rule 403 barrier.  When investigators utilize “general” 
Y-STR DNA testing, the defendant has already been identified.  Forensic examiners 
collect DNA directly from the defendant and then compare his Y-chromosome 
markers to those found at the crime scene.  A Y-STR DNA databank is used only to 
generate match probabilities.  In contrast, “familial” Y-STR DNA testing is 
employed when police are attempting to identify a suspect.  Investigators compare 
the crime-scene sample to Y-STR profiles in a DNA database in the hope of 
producing a “hit.” Again, the database is used to produce match statistics.  
The relatively minor distinction between “general” and “familial” Y-STR DNA 
testing does not affect the Rule 403 analysis.  As demonstrated by the cases above, 
Rule 403 challenges stem from concerns over complicated match statistics and the 
“CSI Effect.” Both general and familial Y-STR testing utilize match statistics to 
determine the probability that an individual with a matching profile was indeed the 
crime-scene contributor.  Without these probabilities, jury members could not 
properly weigh the probative value of Y-STR DNA evidence.  Because general and 
familial Y-STR testing rely on the same exclusionary science, it is highly unlikely 
courts will find familial Y-STR match statistics unfairly prejudicial when general 
match statistics have been consistently admitted.  
Moreover, if real, the “CSI Effect” has no more influence over familial Y-STR 
testing than general Y-STR analysis.  The phenomenon is premised on juror 
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romanticization of DNA evidence—all DNA evidence.  How investigators arrived 
at the particular profile match has no bearing on whether jury members will 
improperly weigh the evidence.  Accordingly, it is unlikely a Rule 403 “CSI Effect” 
challenge will prevail in a case involving familial Y-STR testing, when the same 
argument has been rejected in relation to general Y-STR testing. 
 
C. The Rise of DNA Databases: the Fourth Amendment Question 
 
Notwithstanding the reliability, relevance, or fairness of the general Y-STR 
testing process, critics of familial Y-STR searches argue that probing DNA 
databases for potential relatives violates the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches.  No court has yet assessed the constitutionality of familial 
DNA searches, but critic Erin Murphy points out that biological sample testing 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.”178  In Skinner v. Railway Labor, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that collecting and testing urine samples constitutes a “search” 
because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical 
information and bodily functions.179  Y-STR DNA could be considered a biological 
sample. Krimsky and Simoncelli argue that familial DNA searches constitute Fourth 
Amendment “searches.”180  Noting that such practices will inevitably reveal “family 
secrets” (i.e. paternity, genetic illness, involvement with the criminal justice system, 
etc.),181 these scholars believe familial DNA testing intrudes on reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  
In addition, critics argue familial DNA “searches” are unreasonable.  Murphy 
contends familial DNA searches unreasonably “hinge upon the arbitrariness of 
casting suspicion on offender relatives.”182  She cites Poolaw v. Mercantel, where 
the Tenth Circuit determined an individual’s familial relationship with a suspect 
does not (on its own) establish probable cause for a search.183  Moreover, other 
experts claim familial DNA searches unreasonably target ethnic minorities or larger-
than-average families. Alluding to racial disparities in the criminal justice system, 
Daniel Grimm states “a Hispanic defendant will, on average, lead investigators to 
more biological relatives.”184 
Grimm is not alone.  Maryland banned familial searching at the same time it 
expanded its DNA database collection to arrestees of serious crimes185 (the same 
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legislation which prompted litigation in Maryland v. King).186  Because a 
disproportionate number of racial minorities were routinely arrested for violent 
crimes, legislators felt familial searching would “focus law enforcement efforts on 
a large group of people who are primarily defined by their race.”187  According to 
Stephen Mercer, chief attorney for the Forensics Division of the Maryland Office of 
the Public Defender, “[familial searching] heralded an era of unwanted genetic 
surveillance that just wasn’t reasonable. Why should I forfeit my rights just because 
a family member chooses to commit a crime?”188  D.C. followed suit, convinced that 
Mercer’s argument held weight.189 
However, these constitutional arguments are unlikely to prevail.  First, existing 
case law indicates familial DNA database searches do not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  In Johnson v. Quander, the D.C. Circuit held that “accessing the 
records stored in the CODIS database is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”190  While swabbing an individual’s cheek for Y-STR DNA triggers the 
Fourth Amendment, simply searching a database does not. 
True, familial searching is more likely to work if a larger number of the 
suspect’s relatives are in CODIS, and as Penn State University law professor David 
Kaye admits, “[t]here are a relatively large number of minorities in the database.”191  
Yet Kaye argues “disparate impact is simply not a violation of the equal protection 
clause.”192  From a policy perspective, familial searching has the concerning 
potential to implicate a disproportionate percentage of African Americans and 
Hispanics, but the practice is likely constitutional. The mere fact that a suspect has 
relatives in the criminal justice system should not shield him or her from discovery.  
Assuming the police have probable cause, no individual should be immune from 
investigation and arrest on account of his or her race, family members, or (in the 
case of Y-STR DNA testing) number of paternal male relatives.  The criminal justice 
system operates for the purpose of preventing crimes and catching criminals.  Legal 
and accurate methods should not be discarded simply because they increase police 
efficiency. 
Second, the concept of subjecting relatives to unreasonable or arbitrary “genetic 
surveillance” is misleading.  The U.S. has no universal DNA databank.  Babies are 
not subject to DNA-collecting cheek swabs upon birth.  Neither are adults required 
to submit DNA samples with their employment background checks.  DNA database 
expansion aside, the government may not arbitrarily force an individual to forfeit his 
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or her DNA profile without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  Consequently, 
police cannot access an “innocent” family member’s genetic code unless his or her 
DNA was already collected by law enforcement and entered into CODIS or another 
DNA database.193  If investigators produce a match using Y-STR DNA familial 
searching, they must use process of elimination to determine whether the implicated 
individual is a suspect or a relative. If a suspect, that person’s DNA was previously 
collected in accordance with the Fourth Amendment (i.e., arrest, felony conviction, 
or crime-scene sample).  If a relative, the suspect must be identified and swabbed 
(with probable cause).  Regardless, the DNA collection only occurred because it 
constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
In reality, forensic DNA database collection is relatively limited.  Local 
laboratories only provide CODIS with DNA profiles “taken from arrestees, 
convicted offenders, and forensic evidence found at crime scenes.”194  According to 
the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King, taking a cheek swab from an arrestee who 
was detained under probable cause of committing a serious offense is a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.195  At the time of the opinion, all fifty states 
required DNA collection from felony convicts and twenty-eight states permitted 
DNA collection from some (or all) arrestees.196  Therefore, it is highly unlikely 
CODIS would contain an individual’s DNA unless that person had been convicted 
of a felony, or had submitted to routine booking procedures following an arrest. 
Considering arrestees are innocent until proven guilty, having one’s DNA 
entered into CODIS is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing.  However, 
submitting to mandatory DNA collection is not a common experience for law-
abiding citizens.  The vast majority of U.S. citizens will never have their genetic 
profiles collected and placed in a forensic DNA database.  Ironically, many critics 
argue against familial DNA searches for this very reason.  Murphy categorizes 
familial DNA searches as low-value because they rarely produce hits, pointing out 
that the method fails in California roughly nine times out of ten.197  Indeed, without 
a relative’s DNA already in the system, a familial search is useless.  But if a familial 
search produces a hit, the acquisition of the implicated relative’s DNA has already 
passed Fourth Amendment scrutiny—reducing the “genetic surveillance” argument 
to mere rhetoric. 
Third, “unreasonableness” arguments are less applicable in the Y-STR context.  
Due to the genetic inheritance of identical Y-chromosomes, Y-STR DNA testing 
inherently blurs the line between “general” and “familial” searching.  As mentioned 
in Section B, police use “general” Y-STR DNA testing when they have already 
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found the defendant.198  On the other hand, police use “familial” Y-STR DNA testing 
when they are trying to identify a suspect.  According to Murphy, familial DNA 
searching “refers generally to the idea of looking in a DNA database not for the 
person who left the crime scene sample, but rather for a relative of that 
individual.”199  While this characterization may be appropriate for standard STR 
analysis, it does not accurately apply to Y-STR DNA testing.  
With STR analysis, a familial search equals an intentional or inadvertent 
attempt to retrieve “near misses or ‘partial matches’” from a DNA databank.200  A 
partial match of allele markers suggests the individual could be a blood relative of 
the suspect.  But with Y-STR DNA testing, a partial match cannot implicate either 
the defendant or a family member.  All males in the same paternal line possess 
exactly the same Y-chromosome, so finding a crime-scene sample’s partial match 
actually excludes that person (and that person’s paternal male relatives).  In other 
words, investigators never seek a partial match when utilizing Y-STR testing.  
Moreover, even if investigators get a “hit” when conducting Y-STR DNA 
analysis, they do not know whether the matching profile belongs to the suspect or 
the suspect’s paternal male relatives.  As a result, there is no feasible way to 
intentionally single-out family members with Y-STR testing.  Each time forensic 
examiners undertake “familial” Y-STR DNA testing they are simply seeking 
matching Y-chromosome markers—which ideally belong to the suspect himself.  
Because Y-STR DNA analysis cannot differentiate a “suspect” from a 
“relative,” law enforcement officers cannot target an individual’s family members 
to glean incriminatory DNA evidence.  Rather, investigators must employ classic 
investigatory techniques to uncover the suspect, such as alibis, line-ups, and 
sketches.  Other non-DNA forensic methods may include crime-scene 
reconstruction, ballistic analysis, photographs, skid mark analysis, trace chemical 
evidence, fingerprinting, toxicology, autopsy, and witness statements.  In a sense, 
Y-STR DNA only narrows the field.  A hit is a lead, not a slam dunk.  To use Y-
STR DNA testing effectively, police must build cases carefully—assembling 
corroborating evidence from multiple sources. 
Finally, the court-sanctioned expansion of DNA databases in recent years 
weighs in favor of the constitutionality of familial Y-STR searches.  In Haskell v. 
Harris, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of California’s DNA and 
Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act (DNA Act).201  The court 
determined the DNA Act, which required police to collect DNA samples from all 
adults arrested for felonies, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Although 
compulsory DNA collection raised legitimate privacy questions, the court concluded 
the de minimis physical intrusion, reduced expectation of privacy pursuant to arrest, 
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existing legal protections (i.e. probable cause), and potential for DNA databases to 
solve future/past crimes outweighed privacy concerns.202  This “green-light” for 
employing DNA databases as an investigatory method suggests the court would not 
prohibit familial Y-STR searching on constitutional grounds.  Envisioned as a crime-
solving tool, the use of DNA databases should not be limited to mere collection and 
retention.  
 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: NEXT STEPS FOR STATES 
 
Given the life-saving potential of Y-STR DNA testing, states should adopt 
legislation to codify its admissibility.  Although only ten states utilized familial 
DNA search technology prior to 2017, a growing number of states are enacting 
permissive statutory schemes or signaling their acceptance of the practice.203  
Moreover, the vast majority have yet to address the issue.  Only two jurisdictions, 
Maryland and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation banning familial 
searches.204  Thus, most states could benefit from the careful adoption of pro-YSTR 
DNA search legislation in the future.  
This section proposes a statutory scheme which could be utilized as a drafting 
blueprint for states considering familial DNA search legislation.  My goal in creating 
this proposal was to devise a sufficiently workable and protective statute.  While Y-
STR DNA is a powerful tool, it should be approached with caution.  It is also worth 
noting that this recommended legislation includes several provisions specific to Y-
STR DNA.  My focus on Y-STR DNA over other types of familial search DNA (i.e., 
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mitochondrial, STR, etc.) was intentional, owing to this note’s emphasis on the 
benefits of Y-STR DNA.  
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Proposed Legislation: Familial DNA Searches 
 
(a) Authorization: When STR DNA analysis does not generate a match between a 
forensic DNA sample and a profile in the state DNA databank, a familial search may 
be performed.  To perform a familial search, the following case requirements must 
be met: 
 (1) The forensic DNA sample must be associated with: 
  (i) a felony offense; or 
  (ii) a violent felony offense; or 
  (iii) a crime presenting a significant threat to public safety. 
 (2) The investigating law enforcement officer and the prosecutor must certify that: 
  (i) reasonable investigative efforts have already been taken in the case; or 
  (ii) exigent circumstances warrant a familial search 
 (3) The forensic DNA profile must: 
  (i) be from a single source; or 
  (ii) be a deduced profile from a mixture. 
 (4) The forensic DNA profile must meet the specific requirements of the utilized 
familial search method (e.g., Y-STR DNA testing).  
 (5) The results of the familial search shall only be used as an investigative lead.  
(b) Application: The law enforcement officer and the prosecutor (hereinafter “the 
requestors”) must request a familial DNA search through an application to the state 
division or office of criminal justice services.  
 (1) Upon receipt of an application: 
  (i) the division will confirm that the requestors have certified that the case 
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section have been satisfied.  
 (2) The commissioner of the state division or office of criminal justice services 
shall review all completed applications. 
  (i) If, upon review and evaluation of such application, the commissioner 
determines that any of the case and/or any of the sample requirements are not 
satisfied, the division shall notify the requestors, in writing, that a familial search 
cannot be performed and identify the requirements not satisfied. 
  (ii) If, upon review and evaluation of such application, the commissioner 
determines that all of the case and sample requirements have been satisfied, the law 
enforcement agency, the district attorney, the director of the state crime laboratory, 
and the commissioner must execute a memorandum of understanding detailing the 
role of each organization in the familial search.  
 (3) Upon receipt of the memorandum of understanding described in subparagraph 
(b)(2)(ii), the state crime laboratory will: 
  (i) use validated software to perform a familial search of the DNA databank; 
  (ii) perform Y-STR testing on the crime scene sample(s) if the requirements in 
section (c) are met; and 
  (iii) if appropriate, ensure additional familial testing is performed on the crime 
scene sample, provided there is sufficient forensic DNA sample available for testing. 
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(c) Y-Chromosome Analysis: Y-STR DNA testing may be conducted if the 
following requirements are satisfied:  
 (1) The forensic Y-STR DNA sample must: 
  (i) be from a single male source; or 
  (ii) be from a single male source and one or more female sources. 
 (2) The forensic Y-STR DNA sample must contain at least 7 loci, which were 
identified in accordance with NDIS Operating Procedures. 
 (3) The results of the Y-STR DNA testing are provided in writing, with the 
following provisions: 
  (i) the information may be used for investigatory law enforcement purposes only; 
  (ii) the information is not a definitive statement of a biological identity or 
relationship; and 
  (iii) the release of DNA profiles to non-law enforcement personnel is a violation 
of state law. 
(d) Admissibility: Y-STR DNA testing results may only be admitted into state court 
if the following requirements are satisfied: 
 (1) The results meet state evidentiary standards; and 
 (2) The prosecutor presents the results with an exclusion statistic; and  
 (3) The exclusion statistic has a discriminatory capacity of 1 in 500 or higher.  
 
The basis of this proposed legislation is New York’s familial search statute, 9 
CRR-NY § 6192.3.205  I chose this framework for three reasons.  First, the New York 
Senate passed its bill in 2017—making it one of the most recent states to confront 
the challenges of familial DNA search legislation.206  Second, even among states 
which have embraced Y-STR DNA testing, very little formal familial DNA search 
legislation exists.207  For example, Colorado, California, and Wisconsin have 
developed state policies governing the use of Y-STR DNA technology.208  Yet none 
of these states have developed a statute or regulation expressly permitting its use.209  
Thus, New York boasts one of the few examples available. Third, New York’s 
legislation clearly accounts for the technical difficulties of accurate Y-STR DNA 
testing.  For example, 9 CRR-NY § 6192.3 requires that a forensic Y-STR DNA 
sample be either: (1) from a single male source, or (2) from a single male source and 
one or more female sources.210  This provision guards against miscarriages of justice, 
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such as the wrongful conviction of Chen Long-Qi after law enforcement relied on a 
DNA sample from multiple male sources.211 
My proposal begins with an authorization provision in Section (a).  Inspired by 
a similar section in New York’s familial DNA statute, the language prevents law 
enforcement entities from utilizing familial search technology before they attempt 
an STR DNA analysis.  As discussed supra, forensic scientists generally analyze 
STR DNA samples at thirteen core loci on twenty-two pairs of chromosomes, rather 
than the minimum of seven loci on a single chromosome in Y-STR DNA testing.212 
Accordingly, STR DNA analysis typically generates more discriminating 
exclusionary match statistics than its Y-chromosome equivalent.  To ensure the most 
probative evidence is presented, law enforcement officers should attempt STR DNA 
testing first, before resorting to Y-STR DNA testing. 
Subsections (1) and (2) of Section (a) implement similar safeguards.  First, law 
enforcement entities should only use familial searching in connection with felony 
offenses or threats to public safety.  Because familial search infrastructure is still 
developing, success is no guarantee.  Moreover, depending on the match statistic, 
the probative value of a hit could be too minimal to ensure an accurate conviction.  
Therefore, familial search resources are best utilized in serious criminal 
investigations where the potential benefits outweigh the risks of failure.  Second, 
Subsection (2) ensures that prosecutors and law enforcement officers rely on 
traditional investigative methods before resorting to familial search technology.  As 
suggested in this note, Y-STR DNA testing can be a powerful tool.  However, 
witness interviews, line-ups, suspect sketches, and crime scene photo analysis can 
be equally effective and more cost affordable.  Consequently, Y-STR DNA testing 
should only be employed under the right conditions. 
Section (b) requires law enforcement entities and prosecutors to jointly apply 
for state permission to utilize Y-STR or other familial DNA testing.  I relied on 
California’s Memorandum of Understanding: Familial Search Protocol, as well as 9 
CRR-NY § 6192.3, when developing this section.213  The proposed application 
process ensures that government officials meet all necessary case requirements 
before pursuing familial DNA testing.  Although Section (a) already specifies the 
authorization restrictions, it does not provide an oversight process to check any 
potential government overreach.  This provision does so.  In addition, Section (b)’s 
memorandum of understanding requirement guards against miscommunication 
between agencies.  If each government entity (i.e., investigating agency, prosecuting 
agency, and state crime laboratory) is fully apprised of its familial DNA search 
obligations, the chance of human error decreases.  
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Section (c) discusses testing parameters specific to Y-STR DNA testing.  In 
doing so, the provision accounts for a number of concerns expressed by familial 
search critics.  For instance, Section (c)(2) guarantees that forensic scientists will 
not attempt Y-STR DNA testing on a sample with fewer than seven loci.  To do 
otherwise would permit compromised and potentially inaccurate suspect 
identifications.  Although this subsection does not combat the CODIS racial 
disparities feared by Maryland legislators, it does encourage sufficiently 
discriminating match statistics—decreasing the likelihood of false hits within 
minority communities.  Section (c) also requires the results of any Y-STR DNA 
testing be provided in writing, ensuring that law enforcement and forensic science 
entities reduce inaccuracies through good recordkeeping.  
Finally, Section (c)(3) is inspired by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation DNA 
Familial Search Policy.214  The provision precludes law enforcement from using Y-
STR DNA testing for anything other than investigatory leads.  By prohibiting the 
disclosure of any genetic information uncovered by the Y-STR DNA testing process, 
the section ensures that results will not be used to prove (or disprove) biological 
relationships.  In addition, the provision combats privacy concerns identified by 
Maryland legislators.215  By limiting results to law enforcement uses, Section (c) 
protects individuals from the public exposure of personal health data or paternity 
information.  
Section (d) provides for the admission of Y-STR DNA search results in state 
court if certain conditions are met.  Notably, the provision only addresses state court 
admissibility.  Despite the investigatory potential of familial Y-STR searches, it may 
not be practical for all jurisdictions.  For instance, federal courts and the FBI appear 
hesitant to employ the method.  Although Y-STR DNA is included in CODIS, the 
FBI only uses Y-chromosome profiling in missing persons cases. 216  Furthermore, 
the FBI maintains that familial searching, narrowly defined as “an intentional or 
deliberate search of the database . . . for the purpose of potentially identifying close 
biological relatives,” is not performed at the National DNA Index System (NDIS).217  
The FBI’s anti-familial search policy largely reflects its investigatory priorities. In 
contrast to the state courts, the federal system prosecutes relatively few sexual 
assault cases, meaning Y-STR DNA is less useful.  Furthermore, familial Y-STR 
searches at the national level would likely produce a staggering number of leads.218  
                                                                                                                                                   
214 Colorado Bureau of Investigation, DNA Familial Search Policy (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ColoradoPolicy.pdf. 
215 Two interviewees in a Maryland familial DNA case study “pointed out that we do not know 
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Because whole families can possess the same Y-chromosome, one Y-STR database 
search via NDIS could generate hundreds of hits. 
Subsections (1), (2), and (3) protect defendants from improper usage.  First, the 
Y-STR DNA evidence must meet court evidentiary standards—guaranteeing that 
the state equivalents of Rules 403 and 702 are honored.  Second, the prosecutor is 
required to present all Y-STR DNA evidence in the form of exclusionary match 
statistics, allowing the jury to weigh the probative value of the hit.  Finally, the 
proposed legislation mandates that all exclusionary statistics have a discriminatory 
capacity of one in 500 or higher.  As noted supra, match statistics of one in several 
thousand are typical for Y-STR DNA testing.219  However, in small or isolated 
communities with reduced gene flow (i.e., population substructure), otherwise 
useful match statistics may be less discriminating.  In these instances, an 
exclusionary statistic below one in one thousand might be sufficiently probative to 
assist the fact-finder.  
Population substructure aside, the U.S. District Court for the District Court of 
Arizona held that a match statistic of one in thirty-five is not discriminatory enough 
to meet the Daubert/Frye standard.220  I agree.  At such a weak exclusionary rate, 
any given room could contain three or four men with a matching Y-STR profile.  A 
minimum exclusionary rate of one in 500 splits the difference, accounting for 
disproportionately high allele frequencies in smaller communities while avoiding 
false identifications.  Admittedly, this cut-off is somewhat arbitrary.  When drafting 
their own legislation, states can increase or decrease their minimum exclusionary 
rates to make Y-STR DNA standards more or less stringent.  In addition, states may 
consider the relative impact of gene flow in their respective territories when 
establishing minimum exclusionary rates.  For instance, a less populated state like 
North Dakota may run a higher risk of population substructure than a very populated 
state like California.  While such decisions may require careful research, this 
proposal serves as a starting point for states interested in expanding their available 
DNA technology.  
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF FAMILIAL Y-STR SEARCHES 
 
Like all innovative forensic methods, familial Y-STR DNA searching will face 
an uphill battle before it can attain commonplace usage.  Yet the method is 
undoubtedly gaining traction.  Court acceptance of Y-STR DNA’s scientific 
reliability, high-profile success stories, and legislative support indicate the practice 
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will be acknowledged as a legitimate investigatory method in the future.  Existing 
Fourth Amendment law suggests the technique is constitutional.  Moreover, the 
acceptance of familial DNA search technology in eleven states paves the way for 
other jurisdictions to expressly permit the method.  
As Arizona Director of Public Safety Frank Milstead states, familial DNA 
testing is “probably one of the biggest [forensic] advancements in our lifetimes.  
With this technology, we can bring years of frustration to an end.”221 For police, 
familial Y-STR DNA has the potential to save precious time and close cases.  For 
victims and their families, the benefits of familial Y-STR DNA are profound.  Harley 
Feldman, father of victim Allison Feldman, is now championing the technology to 
state officials and crime laboratories.  In his own words, “[i]t’s for Allison.  I hope 
[familial DNA] provides some relief to other families, like it has done with us.”222 
Instead of ignoring advances in DNA technology, the U.S. criminal justice system 
should embrace this new application of existing resources.  The rewards could be 
tremendous. 
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